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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to study the identity
construction of the Lebanese Phalange Party, postulating
that its view of the Other is deeply entrenched within its
own development. Strongly regarded as a model of Fascist
thought and action, the Phalange, as a popular
manifestation of Maronite nationalist thought, Lebanonism,
seems to be destined for eternal clash with a similarly
endless Other, but this latter is not formulated on religious
basis only: the conceptual idea behind the other remains the
same throughout the Kataeb’s history of conflict, but its
face changes as the nature of the threat to the Phalange’s
political and economic interest changes. The Myth of the
one, static Muslim Other, is thus challenged and
deconstructed; and taking into consideration the traditional
political and economic features of Lebanese society, their
interplay with the state’s institutions, and the Phalange’s
role as a tool of mobilisation, a more complex
interpretation of the construction of the self and Other is
presented.

Introduction
Of the parties to the Lebanese Civil War, the
Phalanges Libanaises have been labelled the most
organised, disciplined and effective element of
the Christian preservative Front, if not both fronts
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of the War. They have similarly gained a
controversial fascist reputation for their espoused
ideology. Indeed the party’s identity is one
closely linked with a reactionary notion of
preservation, and as the manifestation of
Maronite National discourse possessing a
minority complex the Phalange has the tendency
to define itself in opposition to the Other. By that
I mean to stress that it espouses an ideology that
is itself more conscious of the other compared to
similar nationalist thought: certainly any
nationalist notion, by setting out its own
characteristic excludes that of Others, but the
ratio of emphasis is in favour of expressing the
basis on which it (nationalist thought/notion) has
a legitimate right to an independent nation:
common language, common land, historical
incident or narrative, literature, military greatness
etc. That, for instance, is the case with French or
Arab Nationalism. By contrast, the greater part of
Maronite Nationalist discourse (Lebanonism), on
which the Phalange is based, is far more
concerned with the ‘Other’. In many ways in fact,
it could be argued that the Phalange was created
as a reaction to one or more Other.
But this Other is not, as I wish to argue, a static
one based on the traditional religious discourse,
but rather one that is more dynamic, and viewed
with the lens of political and economic interests
and objectives. As a party, the Phalange does not
espouse a different or innovative ideology: it
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rather plays and intermediary role between
intellectual nationalist thought promoting
Lebanonism, and the popular masses. As a tool of
mobilisation it is therefore targeted by its leaders
against the Other, who varies with the variation
to the threat imposed on Lebanonism, be that its
religious, economic or political features.
Methodology and Theoretical Framework
The research relies both on primary and
secondary sources, with more weight awarded to
the latter. The academic writing about the
Phalange’s
history,
Maronite
identity
construction and the civil war, serve as a pool of
knowledge and material that allows an
interdisciplinary reading into the Phalange’s
perception of its self, and more importantly, the
Other. It is important to note that the research is
not based on a philosophical framework, nor will
it go about explaining events through different
philosophical theories about the Other. The
Philosophical concepts are only used in as much
as they further clarify and explain the position the
Phalange takes when it thinks, writes about, or
interacts with the Other. The philosophers
referred to are Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques
Derrida and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, with
particular emphasis on the theory of
Phenomenology.
The final part of the paper presents both content
and discourse analysis of firstly the writings of
3
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Pierre Gemayel, founder and Chief Advisor of
the Phalanges Party, and secondly his son
Bashir’s speeches and interviews in the build up
to his election as president (1 January 1982 – 23
July 1982), which should provide corroborating
support to the interpretation presented. Reference
to other primary sources such as Kataeb and LF
anthems, and posters circulated during the civil
war, will be embedded within the text to further
show how the Kataeb viewed and interacted with
the Other.
Phalange Identity Creation
The beginning of Maronite Nationalist imaginary
may be traced back to clergy writing of the 17th
and 18th century, which was further developed
during the following century, now by both clergy
and laity (Entelis 75). The basic tenets to this
thought is Lebanon's iconic image as a "place of
refuge" particularly for Christian minorities from
the Muslim majority of the Muslim, and
particularly Ottoman empire (Entelis 32). With
such a "persecutionist mentality" (Entelis 32), it
is perfectly rational to expect that Maronite
nationalism would espouse the maintenance and
preservation of the Maronite community and
define the nation (a conventionally secular
notion) along such religious lines. Indeed since
the 1840s, the Maronite clergy "taught that the
idea of Lebanonism was tied to Christianity"
(Suleiman 180). According to Istifan Duwayhi
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"community's history is a continuous struggle to
maintain national and religious identity in a
dominant Muslim environment". It was also
during the 1800s when intellectual nationalist
discourse began to develop from a strictly
"Mountain" theory to one that saw the nation in
terms of living "within a broader political
framework established and maintained by elite
families" (Hourani 36). Certainly one cannot say
that the Maronite community was not particularly
unified and espoused only one view of life, but
there was a certain "homogeneity" (Aulas 1)
particular to it. The fact that the entre Maronite
community was positioned in one place has
allowed them to become more self conscious.
The compact living has seen them share land,
history, and obviously religion which is the basis
to their identity (Entelis 34).
Eventually however, the idea was remodeled
around populist leadership, and eventually, from
1920 and the Establishment of L' État du Grand
Liban, it as the "expression of the interests of the
commercial cities where men must meet in peace
to do business" that tuned political development
to an interconfessional dynamic (Hourani 36). It
is this complex notion that the Kataeb has
adopted ever since its inception: an inherent
contradiction strongly present in its nascent
formulation. The party promotes what is referred
to as a "secular interconfessional Lebanonism,
albeit with strongly Maronite roots" (Entelis 34).

5
Published by AUC Knowledge Fountain, 2016

5

The Undergraduate Research Journal, Vol. 4 [2016], Art. 1
Azab: Phalanges Libanaises

It is the populist representation of the ideologies
of the mountain, of a minority and its view of the
state, its motto is God, Fatherland and the family
(a strong religious proclamation if ever there
was), its chief ideologue has elaborated six
similarities between the Phalange and religion in
terms of their principles and teachings and it
harbours strong relations albeit "personal" with
Maronite Clergy" (Hottinger 138). And yet there
is a constant attempt to emphasise the secular
element. In fact the six similarities were
explained to show little the party was basing its
belief-system on religion, and rather on secular
notions
of
citizenship.
Despite
this
"supranational" discourse of Lebanonism, it is
"apparent that Maronite nationalism was their
prime motive and concern" (Kaufmann 181).
The absence of the party's (or the youth
movement when it was first created)
idiosyncratic ideology is not a sign of
precariousness: through its creation the Kataeb
"reaffirms the political aspirations of the
Maronite community" in terms of pursuing
independence from France and rejecting attempts
to intensify the "Arab character" of Lebanon
(Aulas 16). One would not be exaggerating in
saying that the youth movement was in fact
created as a reaction to the threat of the Other, the
latter being two in the 1930s: the French colonial
power, Syrian nationalism as expressed by Antun
Sa'adeh's SSNP and Arab nationalism that was
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"manifesting itself in the late 1930s and early
1940s" (Entelis 21). Though once useful to the
Maronite community, French presence had long
outlasted its appeal and utility and through this
first interaction we begin to see the pragmatic
and politically expedient conditions upon which
the Phalange views and constructs the Other i.e.
its use to the preservation of the state with its
confessional politics and current power relations
that favour Maronite hegemony, and the state's
independence from colonial power or threats of
accession or incorporation into a bigger entity.
Once French colonialism was hampering the
elite's political interest, France became the other,
and the Phalange was one of the principal actors
calling for independence and the creation of the
1943 National pact. In this latter it had conceded
to Lebanon having an "Arab Face" but rejected
that Lebanese national interest be subordinated to
greater Arab interests (Suleiman 246). The threat
of being absorbed into the predominantly Muslim
Syria was a recurrent fear of the Maronite
community. Though both Syrian and Arab
nationalist are secular notions, they threatened
the "Lebanese homeland as a sovereign and
independent state", an idea that they selfappointed to "foster and safeguard". The extent
of the danger they felt to be presented by the
Other was also expressed during the events of the
1958 civil war, which they called "a war of
survival" that could determine "whether or not

7
Published by AUC Knowledge Fountain, 2016

7

The Undergraduate Research Journal, Vol. 4 [2016], Art. 1
Azab: Phalanges Libanaises

Lebanon would cease to exist as a separate
entity" (Suleiman 235).
This secular view of the Other does not diminish
the fact that Arabism for instance was connected
to Islam, at least in Phalangist world view
(Entelis 80). Karim Pakradouni, an experienced
and intellectual Kataeb leader, has professed that
in many ways "Lebanese interests coincide with
Maronites: one might say that Christians are
more Lebanese and Muslims are more Arabs"
(Pakradouni qtd. in Entelis 80). It is the same
man that also once said that the Phalange, as a
populist party, had a "well determined mass",
hinting perhaps to a religiously based Maronite
following.
In creating the Phalange first as a youth
movement as a defender of the state against the
threat of the Others, the Phalange declared its
intent to help strengthen the state. What is
perhaps unusual is its self appointed duties and
objectives which see it act almost like the state
and the government, a strong emphasis on
identity as a "super vigilante" (Stoakes), that,
would "take action, meet all the demonstrations
with bigger demonstrations, strikes with more
extensive strikes, toughness with toughness, and
force with force" should the state fail to do so
(Pierre Gemayel quoted in Stoakes 222). The
Kataeb, in its own identity construction, sees
itself as a state tool of propaganda and
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indoctrination when it comes to "fostering public
devotion to [the state]" (Stoakes 223), and at
times, the state's replacement. The important
implication of this is that it allows itself
unconditioned
responsibility,
and
more
importantly, the right, to confront the Other.
Political Entrance
With the French Mandate era, the Phalange's own
mandate as a force of liberation expire, and yet
the Other is still present in the two competing
forms of nationalism. Considering itself, as
abovementioned, to be entitled to challenge the
Other and keep him in check was of the reasons
behind the transformation of the youth movement
into a fully operating political party. Other
reasons included of course greater outlets for
mass indoctrination and mobilisation, as well as
to gain more political power vis-à-vis other
national political forces (Entelis 61). The
emphasis however is on how even the country's
own ideology and identity is transformed as a
result of the activities of the other. The move to
stress the individual in its ideological writing was
to oppose the socialist notions of SSNP and other
Leftist parties that evaluated a person's worth on
the group or society to which it belongs (Entelis
72).
The realities of the political process allowed the
Phalange's inherent contradictions to rise to the
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surface, as the seemingly espoused secular notion
came to clash with the incompatible "traditional
and entrenched values of society, such as
communal belongings" which rendered the party,
a product of both "Christian and Maronite"
thought (Jean Sharaf, Kataeb Official quoted in
Lebanese Forces Documentary).
Phoenicianism
As a product of Maronite elite thought,
Phoenicianism certainly found its way into
Phalangist popular discourse, albeit much diluted
to accommodate the complex thought of Michel
Chiha and others associated with the party. The
effect of the Phoenician notion and the extent of
its dissemination to the masses are difficult to
measure, though one can see how it can be used
as a tool of indoctrination of identity and
opposition to the Other. Espousing that Lebanon
had both an irreducible geographic reality whose
"true" borders were restored in the 1920, as well
as a historical reality in terms of civilising
mission, serve to legitimize Maronite nationalism
(for they are the people of that geographic land),
and distance it from the Arab world by presenting
a continuity of Non-Arab heritage.
A Levantine Model of Fascism
That the Phalange holds some fascist elements to
its identity is undeniable: the name is one clear
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manifestation. Following the precedence of other
youth movements created in the Arab world in
the 1930s and 1940s, the Phalange was created
by Pierre Gemayel and four other Christians after
Gemayel’s return from the 1932 World Cup held
in Germany. From this experience he was
inspired to model his youth movement around the
Nazi party, whose discipline, strength,
organisation and “self confidence” were amongst
its many attributes (Entelis 44). Yet the Phalange
cannot be considered an identical replica of the
Nazi, or even of the Spanish Phalanges and the
Italian Fascist Party. Its leaders exhibited no
absorption of extreme and xenophobic Nazi
ideology, and seem to have concerned
themselves with the physical characteristics
rather than racial supremacist notion. The
Phalange was thus a
"nationalist youth
movement devoted more to athletic training for
the purpose of combat than to political power per
se", the Kataeb's early organizational structure,
like the Nazi, was based on the militia, and a
women's auxiliary constituted a separate although
closely affiliated thirteenth department of the
Maslahah (Entelis 22). It seems then that the
only possible similarities were one of a
superficial nation (Entelis 44): the Phalange
modeled the form but not the substantive thought.
Its substantive element was instead the product of
local conditions and local Others.
The Other in the Eyes of the Phalange
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This distinction made above between the
Phalange and Nazi Party for instance, is
important if we are to understand the extremity to
which the Phalange denotes its view and
interaction with the Other. Although in constant
and endless confrontation with it, the Phalange
never took a pledge to exterminate the Other, not
only for their sheer numbers, but the lack of
political and economic wisdom that would mean.
Philosophical Interpretation
The Concept of the Other and the act of
"Othering" are essentially sociological and
anthropological notions that are based to a large
extent on perception. Their importance lies in
their consequences, what an individual or a
group's view of the other may entail in terms of
hierarchy and power relations. Foucault finds a
strong connection between othering, and "power
and knowledge", for when we “other” another
group, we point out their perceived weaknesses
to make ourselves look stronger or better
(Engelund). It implies a hierarchy, and it serves
to keep power where it already lies.
Anthropologically, the Phalange may view its
Other as a fossil or savage other (Sarukkai 1406),
albeit in a diluted way to that of colonialism for
instance. The Other, be it a Syrian or Arab
Nationalist, belongs more to the East and is less
advanced than the Western-oriented, Lebanon of

12
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/urje/vol4/iss1/1

12

Azab: Phalanges Libanaises
Azab: Phalanges Libanaises

the Phoenician civilisation. The Other also
carries with him the remnants of a decaying
political and social system, namely the Ottoman
Empire. But the Phalange is not entirely
dismissive and reductionist in its view of the
Other. Similarly a Sartrean master-slave conflict
also presupposes that something exists which in
scarcity must be shared. In Phalange interaction
with the Other we do not see domination or
modeling of this master-slave conflict. But the
contradiction herein again lies in the dual
concepts the Phalange tries to espouse, one of
difference and equality. The Maronite is clearly
different from if not in certain ways superior to
the non-Maronites, particularly Arab. The
Current political system allows for their
hegemony. To preach secularization and equality
of sects is impossible, seeing that the act of
distinguishing between the self and the other
establishes a hierarchy and a form of legitimacy
for the status quo.
The theory of phenomenology stipulates that
whatever we experience or understand is bound
by our subjective presence and perception, which
takes away any agency from the other. By
Contrast, Emmanuel Levinas, and later Derrida,
claim that the Other is in and of itself a reality
which can never be fully comprehended and
provokes the subject’s thought (Reynolds 65).
The Phalange’s perception lies somewhere in
between: the Party certainly views the other in
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terms of its effect on itself, and defines it as that
which may threaten its own identity, but as
Merleau-Ponty
says
in
defense
of
Phenomenology, when one creates the Other
from one’s own thought, the process is
reversible, meaning that “the other must similarly
borrow themselves from me, create me with their
thoughts” (Reynolds 65), and we certainly see the
Phalange transforming certain ideologies or its
form in order to adapt to the Other. The Other is
not deprived of agency, but on the other hand it is
tangible and known. More importantly the
Phalange recognises this existence and its
integral role in society, and for the most part
chooses to accommodate, within limits, this
Other, and accept a political solution that sees
them working together for the state cycle to turn.
The Other to whom this perception applies is the
Sunni Muslim Other of the Lebanese state.
Certainly the Phalange seems to “tolerate him;
but in fact [it] did not tolerate him as much as
ignored him. And he could ignore him as long as
this Muslim did not threaten to challenge”
Maronite hegemony (Khalaf 46). In light of what
Merleau-Ponty said about the Other creating the
self, it is possible that the non-threatening
existence of the Muslim
Within and without Lebanon was important for
the Maronite/Phalangist self-identification at a
religious, cultural and social level: the rival
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minaret emphasized the importance of the belfry;
the bells answered the Allah Akbar; the defeat of
the Arab armies at the hand of Israel strengthened
his identification with the West; the mediocrity of
governmental and Makassed schools enhanced the
superiority of his own religious educational
system; the Muslim slum areas contrasted against
his neat and comfortable petit bourgeois world..”
(Tewfik 46).

Characteristics of Perception
In times of peace the Phalange continues to
promote its interconfessional notions of unity and
cooperation and has expanded its party work
across the country and throughout various
regions. Perhaps one such evidence for this is the
fact that it is not entirely Maronite exclusionary:
there are around 6% Shiites, 2% Jew, 1% Druze
and 1% Sunni Muslims and 10% (Greek
Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Protestant, Armenian
Catholic, etc.) among 80% Maronite domination
(Entelis 21). This recognition of Lebanese
plurality and the need to work with the Other is
an economic and political decision, suggesting
that there is more to the Phalange's formulation
of the other than simply religious lines.
The other is neither dehumanised nor demonised,
particularly throughout the Party’s mobilisation
tools, such as its anthems. Analysing 22 anthems
of the Phalanges Libanaises, the preponderance
of the content is more interested in highlighting
the members’ identity, particularly that of the
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Mountain, with strong lyrical descriptions of the
mountain villages. It reaffirms its connection to
the notions of duty, work and hope. The Kataeb
proudly site the Lebanese anthem at the top of
the Party’s list (although not written by a party
member) which again serves to highlight the
unbreakable link between the State and the
Phalanges’ raison d’être. The Christian element
is also visible with references to the Virgin Mary
and metaphors of wine. Yet in all of it, little
reference is made to the other: only once were
each of the following words found in the 22
anthems lyrics (foreigner, enemy, treachery,
thief, and intruder) and those were only included
during the anthems pronounced during the more
extreme events of the civil war. The enemy is
never defined nor named, and the anthems are
genuinely non-vocal of the enemy or even the
Other at large (see Appendix 2).
As much as its ideological discourse is based on
Maronite national thought (to a significant extent
viewing the Muslim as the Other), and as much
as its Fascist basis sees the Other in terms of Anti
Lebanese Nationalism (Arab and Syrian
Nationalism), the Other is also sometimes the
Left, as a force of reform threatening the political
institutions of the state that have preserved the
Maronite economic interests. The Phalange is
also a political tool of the elite and the state and
is finely embedded into the establishment:
government ministers post 1958 have almost
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always included a Phalangist, the party's militia
are acting as parallels to state apparatus -they
were sent along with the police to disperse a
strike held in the AUB in 1972 (Traboulsi 170172), and its leaders are "occupationally strictly
bourgeois men of the establishment the majority
of whom are over the age of 50” (Entelis 121). In
fact during the Civil War, the "Phalange, opposed
to any kind of reform, was repeating, in a
situation of crisis, its function as defender of
narrow sectarian privileges in the service of the
big class interest" (Traboulsi 176). An amalgam
of these conditions comes together when the
Muslim is himself the Arab and the force of
Leftist reform. Even without such a situation
unfolding, the Phalange already views the Other
through such complex construction: Arab
Nationalism they consider to be deeply attached
to Islam, and the Left to be, not "simple symptom
of social injustice but represents a conspiracy and
a fifth column, particularly on the part of
Lebanon's Arab enemies (Stoakes 218). The
substance of the Other is thus static, for it does
not go out of these described borders, but its face
and form are dynamic, changing with the nature
of the threat to the Phalange identity and self.
The view of the Other is sometimes not a whole
community's, but nuanced with the perception of
one man in power. Such leaders seeking political
ambition, can alter the view of the Other to
include competition even of the same sect and
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eliminate them, perhaps even more cruelly than
the communal Other, as was the case with
Bashir's elimination of leaders of militias who
could have competed with him for the support
and loyalty of the Christian and particularly
Maronite community: in late 1976, those of
Raymond Edde, in Jubayl; in 1978, those of
Sulayman Franjiyah, in Zgharta; and in 1980,
those of Camille Chamoun, in Safra (Aulas 21).
Civil War Episode
Although still conscious of the Other and follow
the same dynamics mentioned above, the civil
war events introduce certain factors that result in
great contradictions: at some points the
Phalange's perception and interaction with the
other is radicalised to its extremes, at others it
seems to be rendered to complete breakdown of
what we expect the Phalange to view the other as,
albeit only temporarily. These factors are briefly
the need to prioritise, the various degrees of
threat (proximal and distant, eminent and far
removed), which leads to the third: desperate
times that call for desperate measures.
The Phalange found itself, as the voice and
protector of the Maronite community, the force
of preservation of the and the establishment to
which it is had become strongly a part of,
surrounded by several Others, growing in danger
and threat, and likely inviting more Others to
interfere in the status quo. There was the "spectre
18
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of the secular state that would suppress Maronite
supremacy" (Aulas 18) as espoused by the
Progressive Party and others calling for reform;
there was the evidently increasing number of
Palestinian population and Rogue PLO
commandos with little respect for Lebanese
sovereignty and state decisions, and further
threatening of a potential Israeli invasion to
eliminate them; and there was thus the combined
the fear that these progressives "might make
[use] of Palestinian Armed militias (Aulas 18).
Coupled with such were the signs of beginnings
in the breakdown of communal structure amongst
the young Christian students (Aulas 18). The
heightened sense of threat and radicalisation of
the Other is certainly clear: the Other becomes
almost always the enemy, and was identified in
the early stages as the Palestinians and
Communism. That enemy was "the source of all
evil, be it political, economic, social or otherwise
(Aulas 19). The minority complex also reappears,
intensified, the Al'Amal newspaper of the
Phalange once saying in an issue on August 20th
1975, that "the political domination of the
Maronite was the only guarantee for a minority
condemned to oppression by a majority that was
oppressive by its very nature as a majority"
(quoted in Traboulsi 189).
But despite this radicalisation we still see traces
of the view of the Other from the times of peace:
the Phalange, at least in the earlier stages of the
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war, were careful to maintain that the struggle
was essentially between Lebanon and the PLO,
which would allow the army to confront and
eliminate the threat (Sirriyyeh 86). The
understanding was still that the Lebanese Muslim
Other was still an integral part of the state
system, and to ostracize him, or categories him
along with the PLO, was to contribute to the
disintegration of the state. A scale of Othering
thus begins to unfold, with the PLO being quite
at the top, followed by communism, and again
the Muslim Other is at least not publicly labelled
as a threat. The Logic behind this hierarchy of
Others is very compelling: it takes into
consideration proximity and the extent of
eminent danger. The PLO and the camps they use
as their bases are within the state itself, and are
consistently showing signs of indifference
towards the state and aggressive behaviour
towards Israel that does not make considerations
for the consequences that may have on the
Lebanese state. The extent of the threat the PLO
imposed is reflected in words and actions of the
Phalange, and by extension the LF. Palestinian
presence was referred to as a "historical and
dangerous turn of events" 1 (Lebanese Parties
Documentary) and the events of Sabra and
Shatila that see the LF reach its extreme
radicalisation and exterminator mentality,
emphasize the extent to which the PLO were
1

ﻣﻨﻌﻄﻒ ﺗﺎﺭﻳﺨﻲ ﻭ ﺧﻄﻴﺮ
20
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considered an existential threat (Zisser 69). But
always the Phalange viewed its behaviour as
reactionary. The fault was not theirs, for they
were only acting in reciprocity to protect their
state: it was the Palestinians that were elaborately
creating a state within a state, it was the "bus'
provocative entrance" into Ein Rummaneh that
justified the incident, even if there were children.
(Amin Gemayel, quoted in Lebanese Parties
Documentary).
It is therefore this huge imbalance between the
various Others, and the their eminent defeat to
the forces of reform coalescing with the PLO,
that sees the Phalange forego its long Othering of
Syria, and request, through president Sarkis
(Rabil 23), that they intervene to their salvation,
despite the awareness of Syria's continued
interest in Lebanon. It seemed that the priority
was to the survival of the Christian front, the
elimination of the closer Palestinian threat, and
began a precarious trend of overlooking the longterm threat of the Other for the sake of the now
and here and to "help safeguard the community’s
privileges and secure its political survival" (Rabil
32), and a few years later breaking with that
Other and seeing it then as the main threat. The
contradiction is evident in the way the Christian
villages welcomed the Syrian Army with rice,
and how a year later in 1977 the Phalange was to
turn entirely against their presence as forces of
occupation (Pakradouni quoted in Lebanese

21
Published by AUC Knowledge Fountain, 2016

21

The Undergraduate Research Journal, Vol. 4 [2016], Art. 1
Azab: Phalanges Libanaises

Parties Documentary). Similarly, in its
relationship with Israel, the Phalange (and by
now LF) leadership shows that it was political
expediency, pragmatism and ambition that
determined their decision to ask for Israeli
intervention. The Phalange may have had few
links with Israel, but it certainly did not look to
Israel as a strong ally that parallels its own
dilemma, but a state that was not interested in
occupying and acceding Lebanon to its
territories, but interested in a chance to eliminate
the PLO and install a friendly regime, that of
Bashir Gemayel. This myth of a special
relationship is weakened when again Bashir acts
in his own self interest and refuses to return the
favour by signing a peace treaty with Israel
(Zisser 68), for fear of the repercussions that
would have on his newly installed presidency and
whatever ambitions he may still have harboured.
Selected Political Posters of the Civil War
If the civil war was widely considered to be “the
war of the Others”, then posters circulated during
the war should prove instrumental in analysing
the representation of the various Others by the
Phalange. A selection of 12 such posters support
the hereto explained national and patriotic
identity of the phalange, the hierarchic scale of
Others it has created, as well as its prudence in
not demonizing or dehumanising particularly the
Muslim Other.
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(Images from Zaina Maasri’s Off the Wall,
Political Posters of the Lebanese Civil War)

Figure 1

Figure 2

The image of Lebanon within the 1920 borders
features heavily throughout the posters, as well as
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the cedar icon, emblematic of both the Lebanese
state and the Phalange and highlighting the
inseparability of both. In a specific poster (figure
6) the Lebanese Flag and that of the Phalange are
fused together, with the Phalange anthem
shedding blood in a scene that reaffirms the
Phalange’s self appointed role as defender and
vigilante of the state. In another poster (figure
2), Martyrdom is presented through the image of
a bleeding soldier defending the Lebanon as seen
within the 1920s border. The Christian element
appears as well, where figure 1 presents an image
of a serene and peaceful Christian village where
the farmers goes about with his livelihood while
the white dove symbolises peace, and is
associated with the church bells visible in the
background. In another image, the subtlety of the
Arabic language stresses the difference between
the Phalangist combatant, and the Druze killer
(by removing the Arabic equivalent of the letter
M). The combatant is a devout and God fearing
individual kneeling at the crucifix before he goes
to fulfil his patriotic duty, where as the Druze
killer wears traditional clothes that denote a
barbaric connotation. It is also notably the only
one that negatively portrays the other.
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Figure 5

Figure 6

Figure 10
On the other hand, representation of the PLO is
much more violently vocal and uncompromising.
The massacre of Ein El Rummaneh, a violent
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incident, is boldly portrayed as “the dawn of
freedom” and the beginning of the expulsion of
the enemy and the restoration of the state
(Figures 9 and 12).

Figure 9

Figure 12
The presence of the Syrian Other high up the
scale of Othering is similarly poignantly
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portrayed. In figure 11 a Trojan horse,
representing treachery and feigned friendship,
enters the Lebanese state from the Syrian border.
The Trojan horse lets through hoards of tribes on
horses, implying barbarity and inferiority, while
the label is of the ADF, condemning Arab
conspiracy with the Syrian. The only regions or
villages labelled are those of Phalange strong
holds
(Zahleh,
Ein
Rummaneh,
and
Ashraffiyyeh) and reaffirm the Phalange
perception of the self as the only defendant and
saviour of the state. Figure three similarly
portrays a Kataeb-led Lebanon expel a tank
(presumably Syrian) from Lebanon. Perhaps the
most symbolic poster representation is that of a
Phalange body carrying on its back the
“Lebanese Case” shaped in the borders of 1920
Grand Liban and racing with a torch titled
“liberation”, crushing as it does so hoards of
retarded enemy Arabic tribes and camels. The
Phalange body has one eye (a pun on the name of
Ein El Rummaneh where the war erupted and
which the Phalange perceive as the beginning of
their patriotic struggle), an eye which a caption
describes to be always awake when all others are
sleeping, conveying a notion of an ever vigilant
eye protecting the nation (see figure 4).
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Figure 11

Figure 4
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Figure 3

Phalango-Israeli Relations: The Myth of the
Favoured Other
It is a common misconception that Israel and the
Phalange have been favourite allies, particularly
during the civil war. Due to their identical
predicament - representing minorities surrounded
by the threat of Muslim majorities and Western
support- the two political representatives of the
community were bound to cooperate closely,
particularly on issues of security. There is a
consensus that in the nascent stages after the
breakdown of the Ottoman empire and the
creation of the Lebanese state, there were
flirtations between the Jewish Yishuv and
Maronite community as to potential relations
(Zisser 890). There is also strong archival
evidence that that Zionist movement "for its part,
for many years nursed the dream of a Zionist–
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Maronite alliance (there were even those who
went so far as to speak of a Canaanite–
Phoenician alliance)" (Zisser 400). A discovered
set of email correspondence between David BenGurion and Sharrett during the former's voluntary
exile, in which he expressed how were captivated
[he was] by the dream of establishing a Western
and pro-Israeli regime in Lebanon" (Zisser 400).
There was also at the same time, some Israeli
leaders entertained the idea of promoting a
political reversal in Lebanon that would lead to
the establishment of an Israeli–Maronite alliance.
The events unfolded differently however: Ben
Gurion never advanced his dream, probably for
reasons of political pragmatism, and the "Israeli
leadership refrained from becoming involved in
Lebanon’s affairs" (Zisser 400). There is many a
reason for such a position. Firstly, the
correspondence was always with individuals
from the Maronite community whose power base
was gradually weakening and who had no longer
expressed the majority's views (Zisser 891).
Secondly, the Israeli leadership always
considered the Maronites to be "were too small
and weak a community for this fellow-feeling to
have much consequence", and that although "the
Israelis were not averse to a Phalangist takeover
in Lebanon; they were, however, dubious as to its
Prospects" (Rabinovic, quoted in Khashan 322).
The same notion was expressed a few decades
later when during a meeting between Franjieh,
Phalange and the Israelis the latter expressed
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their unwillingness to be involved in the ongoing
turmoil (Traboulsi 196). Finally, there was never
any formal "orderly and binding pattern of
negotiations between Israelis and Maronites in
the early years after the establishment of the State
of Israel" (Zisser 800) that could be used for a
narrative where the Maronites considered the
Israelis the Other closest to their self.
There is in fact very little evidence that the
Phalange even saw their identity to parallel that
of Israel or that the latter had any claim of
legitimacy for Palestine. The party has
consistently argued that [Palestine was an
indivisible Arab country, and denounced the
related UN resolution (Entelis 249). Similarly,
they point out to having lived in Lebanon since
time immemorial and own the land where as the
Jewish state was created out of a Diaspora
(Entelis 249). Maronite politicians, including
Pierre Gemayel, "adopted an anti-Israeli stand, at
least for public consumption" (Zisser 897). The
Myth that Phalango-Israeli relations were not just
based on practical politics and restricted to
money, arming and training only during the civil
war, but that the relation is built on a strong sense
of similarity and mutual security needs, therefore
does not logically follow.
The only documented encounters between Israeli
officials and the Phalange have been devaluated
for their lack of significance and corroborating
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evidence. Studying Archival material from the
Israeli Foreign Ministry, both Benny Morris and
Elias Zisser discover that the only two
correspondences linking the Phalange were
through indirect channels and it is highly likely
that the representatives were acting on their own,
without orders from Phalange leadership. The
first was a report about an envoy of Archbishop
Mubarak of Beirut in the 1940s who claimed that
he spoke on behalf of the Phalange in addition to
the Archbishop when he expressed Maronite
interest in taking over the state. Not only were
the envoy's links to the Phalange verified, but
neither was his link to the Archbishop. The
second report was on Elias Rababi, the writer of
the Phalange AlAmal party. Again he strongly
espoused certain requests and demands which,
according to him were Gemayel's, but which
were never verified, and more importantly,
Rababi's narrative was in contradiction to the
events on the ground in Lebanon, of Phalange
statements and publications, and it is likely that
he communicated on his own endeavour, and
similarly also benefit solely from the limited funs
he'd demand from the Israeli Officials
(Zisser/Morris).

The Party as a Za’im: Economic Interpretation
If the extremity of the situation and the
ostracization of the Other had reached such
32
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levels, then a legitimate question would be as to
why the Phalange, as the leader of the Christian
Front, did not pursue secession and the creation
of a small isolated Maronite state. The answer
again lies in the understanding of the economic
role the Phalange played, not truly as a party, but
as a Za’im, a representative of Maronite
commercial elites, and serving as a tool of the
establishment.
Hottinger's definition of a Za’im is one who,
in peacetime
is the recognized leader of a
community who has the power to speak for his
clients as a group or as individuals, who is expected
to take action in their and in his interest whenever
necessary. In peacetime he is the man to whom an
individual, of a certain traditional outlook in life,
will go if he has business to transact with somebody
stronger than himself, and above all, with the
government (Hottinger 128).

These features are certainly visible in the
Phalange’s regular activities. It has played a
“great role in establishing patronage client and
offering services” in such a way that while they
“replaced many regional and clanic notables”
they nevertheless “fulfilled the same traditional
function” (Khalaf 45, 47). Where they did not
replace them, the Phalange “supplanted” them
but on a much larger scale of organisation and
efficiency suitable for its enlarged role and
importance within the state establishment.
Carrying out such an elaborate system was to a
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large extent fuelled by the financing provided by
Maronite elites in the Commerce and Finance
sectors who had dominated the economic scene
(Traboulsi 157) and whose interest the Phalange
represented (Alami).
The Phalange, as a rather unusual model of a
Za’im, therefore had many economic interests to
protect, not only that of the Maronite community
but particularly their Finance elites. In a report
presented to the Political Bureau on July 1 1977
and published in “Beirut Evening” magazine, it
was expressed that the Phalange sees detrimental
economic losses if a secessionist stance should be
taken for two specific reasons: the Maronite
finance elites were heavily dependent on
petrodollars and open market relations with the
Arab and particularly Gulf countries, and funding
the “petit Liban” could not rely on emigrants
remittances, would still be “[in] need [of] the
Arab hinterland” (Khalaf 54) and thus would be
unfeasible. The report therefore concludes that
instead of allowing the clash with the Other to
reach its natural conclusion, the solution was
elaborated in 3 steps that should (1) sustain and
consolidate Phalange control over existent areas
(2) sees further expansion into other regions, in
order to finally (3) create a real state to weaken
progressive forces (LNM) and expel the PLO.
The Other, for reasons of economic interest and
pragmatism, was not to be blocked out.
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The Family as the Party: Qualitative Analysis
In this final section I wish to present content and
discourse analysis of writing and speeches
belonging to Pierre Gemayel and his son Bashir,
as representative of the Phalanges (and its LF
offshoot) identity and view of the other, at the
risk of the analysis being prima facie considered
reductionist. I believe that the nature and
dynamics of the Phalanges allows the analysis of
their main iconic leaders’ discourse to be a
sufficiently accurate representation of the
Phalanges as a whole. Firstly, a particular figure
is essential for any fascist party, where the lines
between the party and the man are usually
blurred. The leader is the embodiment of the
party's doctrines and a deep sense of loyalty and
hero-worship, if not idolatry, are felt towards the
leader by all the members. That certainly seems
to be the case of both Pierre and Bashir, whose
wisdom and strength are reiterated throughout the
Phalange and LF anthems (Appendix 1). Figures
7 and 8 also reflect the strong association the LF
had made between Bashir and the salvation of the
state, and how particularly after his death, any
hope for a reconciled and saved Lebanon was
lost. Secondly, the party decision making process
is based on a meticulously hierarchical structure
(Stoakes 223) in which freedom of expression is
allowed in the lower Aqsams, but there is a
recognition and acceptance of the fact that the
final say is that of the Chef at the top of the
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pyramid. The party exercises strict disciplinary
and subordinating actions in a greater framework
of "autocratic centralism" (Entelis 26).

Figure 7

Figure 8

Pierre Gemayel: Aradna Lubnan Watanan La
Kanisatan Wala Gami’an and Connaissances
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Des Kataeb: Leur Doctrines et Leur Politique
Nationales
In both writings there is a strong and highly
repetitive emphasis of the independence and
sovereignty of Lebanon 2, its particular mission3
and its incompatibility with the Arab and Syrian
Other. The extent to which the Other is important
is sensed throughout the writings, which take a
defensive position and does not fail to point out
as much as it can the idiosyncrasy and difference
of Lebanon. References to Phoenicianism are
clearly made for the same effect 4. Pierre also
states that the protection of the existence of the
state is their utmost important duty5, and that

2

Le liban a servi au course des siècles, d'asile et de refuge
aux minorités étniques et religieuses persécutées.

3

Liban est une mission. Cette mission est antinomique à
celle que les Arabes aspirent généralement à réaliser. Le
liban est une entité irréductible.

4

Réalité historique, le Liban moderne, reprenant la
succession de l’antique Phénicie, s’est constamment
imposé, depuis six siècles, à l’attention du monde. Qu’on
veille bien se rappeler le rôle décisif qu’il joua
politiquement et militairement, dans l’Histoire de l’Orient,
sous Fakhreddine le Grand, sous l’émir Youssef, sous
Béchir le Grand et dans la crise internationale de 1840 - all
what follows Christian figures. No Muslims.

5

L’existence de la Nation libanaise – ayant une vocation
historique de culture et de tolérance – est un fait que nous
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they take it upon themselves to indoctrinate the
youth with Lebanese nationalism. The inherent
contradiction 6 between the claimed secular
position and the strong Christian roots of the
Phalange ideology are abundantly clear: on one
occasion Pierre Gemayel says he is proud to be a
Christian and honoured to be the voice of this
group 7. Although the ambiance is defiant of Arab
and Syrian 8 other, the Lebanese Muslim is rarely
nous sommes donnés pour mission de maintenir, de
défendre et de renforcer.
L’enseignement, libre et officiel, doit être dirigé dans un
sens national. La neutralité à l’égard du Liban est
inadmissible.
Les Phalanges Libanaises sont donc heureuses d'assumer la
mission de mettre en garde contre les dangers des
mouvements d'ordre confessionnel qu'agite une fraction des
habitants du pays.
6

En un mot, nous rejetons vigoureusement toute idéologie
théocratique qui, dans d’autres pays, est le fondement de la
constitution : nous sommes pour une législation civile,
laïque, respectueuse des religions, mais excluant toute
sujétion à un droit canon déterminé, fût-il chrétien ou
coranique.

7

Je suis hereux, moi Pierre Gemayel, Chrétien, fier de mon
Christianisme et attaché à ses préceptes et à ses
commandements par toutes les forces puisses dans la foi et
la fidélité.

8

Nous rejetons la théorie d’une Syrie géographique en tans
qu’elle dénierait la réalité physique du Liban. Cette théorie
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mentioned, and Gemayel is keen to show respect
to Islam throughout his discourse. In an
interesting instant, Gemayel accuses the Other of
something to avert the same accusation from his
self: he says that he insists to a new census but
that the emigrants should be included, not
because the Maronites would certainly benefit
from the increased numbers, but because,
according to him, the Other does not wish to find
himself in a weakened position 9.
Bashir Gemayel: Speeches
Seven years into the civil war, the speeches
analysed represent a moment deeply imbued in
the turmoil and are reflected in the more vocal
and extreme discourse of the Other. Across these
speeches and interviews, reference to the
Palestinian and Syrian Other are strongly
apparent and dominate the content. It is highly
negative, associating the Syrian with occupation
and the Palestinian with settlement. They are
both written as The Palestinian/Syrian, an
individuation of the enemy in such a way that

œuvre d’orientalistes asservis à des politiques
d’impérialisme, ne repose sur aucun fondement historique.
9

Nous réclamons avec insistance un recensement général à
condition de ne pas continuer a considérer les émigrés
comme des parias qu'il faut scinder et éliminer de la
collective libanaise.
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any Palestinian and any Syrian is an occupier, a
traitor, and as twice mentioned, a parasite.
The Lebanese Other by contrast, is rebuked,
reprehended perhaps for his inconsistency, his
lag in finally realising that it is the Syrian and
Palestinian that are his enemy and not his
Christian Lebanese Brother, but never portrayed
by Bashir to be malevolent or to harbour
malicious and anti-Lebanese intents. If anything
he is delayed by his attachment to the decayed
remnants of the Ottoman “occupation” and is
easily manipulated and brainwashed by the
Arabs, he is deluded, and languid: if one is to
wait for him one will have to wait, according to
Bashir, for 200 years. Interestingly, Bashir
resembles his father in both men’s pointing of a
specific accusation to the Other which just as
much could be pointed to them: it is only the
Lebanese (Muslim) Other who can take a
decision different to or opposing the Christians;
the latter on the other hand, regardless of what
decision they take, cannot be considered to
oppose him. To oppose, to create conflict, is a
characteristic denoted only to the Other; it is
inconceivable for the Christian to take a decision
that can be interpreted as distancing or
dismissing the Other.
There is certainly a sense of detachment from this
Lebanese Other who, regardless of whether he
sees the light or not, the Christians will go ahead
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with their plans for liberating Lebanon from the
Other who in more aggressive terms is also
labeled the foreigner and the enemy. Israel is one
other that Bashir rarely mentions, for reasons of
political pragmatism, and when it is mentioned, it
is referred to as an independent actor with his
specific objectives targeting the PLO, who is not
interested in Lebanon and is therefore neither a
threat nor an ally of the Christians. In fact in the
communiqué he released after the Israeli
invasion, was calm and collected, his words
expressed no anger or a call for unity against the
invaders. Israel was only mentioned once and
only on a passing notice. It is interesting to note
that the Lebanese Muslim is also referred to, in a
much moderate sense, as the Sunni, and
surprisingly, the Lebanese Other, which serves as
Bashir’s blatant view of the Muslim of Lebanon
as the Other, rather than a part of a large
Lebanese Self.
Along such sectarian lines
Christian supremacy appears quite frequently, not
in the sense of a superior race, but as the
community that has taken the vanguard in
protecting the state and has presented martyrs to
the cause where as the Muslim Other has not
recognised who the true enemy is. The
connection between the Christian community and
the state of Lebanon is undeniable, with strong
emphasis on Mountain’s position as the core and
centre of the Lebanese state, emphasis on the
borders that create a Lebanon of 10452 Km2 and
that extends back to a 6000 years old civilization,

41
Published by AUC Knowledge Fountain, 2016

41

The Undergraduate Research Journal, Vol. 4 [2016], Art. 1
Azab: Phalanges Libanaises

giving the Christian community at least
legitimacy to its claim in this struggle as opposed
to the less decorated Other.
There was one particular speech which embodied
the whole spirit and the dynamics behind
Bashir’s discourse: that being the speech he made
in Ein Rummaneh for the 7th anniversary of the
beginning of the war (13/4/1982). It emphasised
all of the abovementioned views of the various
dangerous Syrian, Palestinian 10 and more languid
and hesitant Lebanese Other 11 12; the supremacy
of the Christians 13 and their avant-garde 14role,
while refuting any plans of secession and
isolationism; all in a more intense and elaborate
presentation.
9F

10F

12F

1

F

13F

10

ﻧﻘﻭﻝ ﻟﻼﺟﺊ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺳﻁﻳﻧﻲ ﺃﻥ ﻳﺑﺣﺙ ﻋﻥ ﺻﺣﺭﺍء ﺃﺧﺭﻯ ﻳﻧﻘﻝ ﺍﻟﻳﻬﺎ ﺧﻳﺎﻣﻪ ﻭ
 ﻭ ﺃﻥ ﺧﻣﺱ ﻓﻠﺳﻁﻳﻧﻳﻳﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺑﻭﺳﻁﺔ ﻟﻳﺳﻭﺍ ﻗﺎﺩﺭﻳﻥ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺭﻣﻳﻧﺎ,ﺗﻧﻛﺭﻩ ﻟﻠﺟﻣﻳﻝ
.ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺑﺣﺭ
11
ﺍﻟﻠﺑﻧﺎﻧﻲ ﺍﻷﺧﺭ ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﺑﺩﺃ ﻳﺗﻔﻬﻡ ﻟﻣﺎﺫﺍ ﺍﺿﻁﺭﺭﻧﺎ ﺍﻟﻰ ﺍﺯﺍﻟﺔ ﺗﻝ ﺍﻟﺯﻋﺗﺭ ﻭ ﻟﻣﺎﺫﺍ
ﻗﺎﻭﻣﻧﻝ ﻭ ﺣﺎﺭﺑﻧﺎ ﺳﺑﻊ ﺳﻧﻭﺍﺕ ﻭ ﺍﻟﻳﻭﻡ ﺷﺭﻳﻛﻧﺎ ﺍﻟﻠﺑﻧﺎﻧﻲ ﻳﻌﺎﻧﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻌﺎﻧﺎﺓ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ
 ﻧﺣﻥ ﻧﺣﻳﻳﻬﻡ ﻭ ﻧﻬﻧﺋﻬﻡ ﻭ ﻟﻭ ﺗﺄﺧﺭﻭﺍ ﻓﻲ. ﺳﻧﻭﺍﺕ7 ﻋﺎﻧﻳﻧﺎ ﻭ ﻧﻌﺎﻧﻲ ﻣﻧﺫ
.ﺍﻟﺗﺻﺭﻑ
12
 ﺍﻥ ﻣﺻﻳﺭﻩ ﻳﻘﺿﻲ ﺃﻥ ﻳﺷﺎﺭﻙ ﺃﺧﺎﻩ ﺍﻟﻠﺑﻧﺎﻧﻲ ﻻ ﺃﻥ ﻳﺷﺎﺭﻙ:ﻧﻘﻭﻝ ﻟﻪ ﺃﻳﺿﺎ
.ﺍﻟﻐﺭﻳﺏ ﻓﻠﺳﻁﻳﻧﻳﺎ ﻛﺎﻥ ﺃﻡ ﺳﻭﺭﻳﺎ
13
 ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻣﺟﺗﻣﻊ ﻫﻭ ﺍﻟﻸﻛﺛﺭ: ﺍﻟﺩﺍﻣﻭﺭ, ﺗﺭﺷﻳﺵ, ﻋﺑﻧﻁﻭﺭﺓ, ﺯﺣﻠﺔ,ﻋﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﺭﻣﺎﻧﺔ
.ﺛﺑﺎﺗﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻟﺑﻧﺎﻥ
14
ﺍﻥ ﻣﻘﺎﻭﻣﺗﻧﺎ ﻫﻲ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺟﻌﻠﺕ ﺍﻟﺷﻳﻌﻲ ﻳﻧﺗﻔﺽ ﻓﻲ ﻭﺟﻪ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺳﻁﻳﻧﻲ ﻭ ﺟﻌﻠﺕ
.ﺍﻟﺳﻧﻲ ﻳﻧﺗﻔﺽ ﻓﻲ ﻭﺟﻪ ﺍﻟﺳﻭﺭﻱ
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Table 1: Content Analysis of 76 Arabic sources:
(64) Speeches and (12) Articles.
Category

The Other

Key Words

Arabic

ﺍﻟﺴﻮﺭﻱ

The Syrian

The
Palestinian

ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺴﻄﻴﻨﻲ

Tally Notes/Com
ments
Other
Individualiz
ed by the
90 use ""ﺍﻝ
Foreign
Other
Associated
with
Barbarism
115 and dirt

Associated
Phrases

ﻳﻠﻄﻲ
ﻳﺒﺤﺚ ﻋﻦ
ﻣﻜﺎﻥ ﻳﺨﺮﺑﻪ
ﺍﻟﻔﺎﺳﻄﻴﻴﻦ
ﻫﻨﻪ ﺍﻟﻠﻲ ﻋﻢ
ﻳﺤﺮﻗﻮﺍ
ﺍﻻﺭﺽ ﻭ
, ﺍﻻﺳﻮﺍﻕ
ﻣﺶ
ﺍﻻﺳﺮﺍﺋﻠﻴﻴﻦ

The
Lebanese

ﺍﻟﻠﺒﻨﺎﻧﻲ
ﺍﻟﻤﺴﻠﻢ

not an

100 enemy but a
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Muslim

partner of
the
Nation/Stat
e

Words
Associated
with
Lebanese
Muslim

ﺍﻟﻠﺒﻨﺎﻧﻲ
ﺍﻻﺧﺮ
ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻳﻚ

Druze

Israel

Conflict

The
Enemy/Forei
gner/Nightm

ﺍﻟﺪﺭﻭﺯ

ﺍﺳﺮﺍﺋﻴﻞ
/ﺍﻟﻌﺪﻭ
ﺍﻟﻐﺮﻳﺐ
ﺍﻟﻜﺎﺑﻮﺱ/

referred to,
not as
enemy but
brethren
10 ()ﺍﺧﻮﺍﻥ
*never
referred to
as the
enemy,
rarely
mentioned
and context
fearful of an
invasion to
fight the
4 PLO.

22
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are

ﺍﻟﺘﻌﺪﻱ

4

(Syrian)
Occupation

ﺍﻻﺣﺘﻼﻝ
()ﺍﻟﺴﻮﺭﻱ

13

(Palestinian)
Settlement

ﺍﻟﺘﻮﻁﻴﻦ
()ﺍﻟﻠﺒﻨﺎﻧﻲ

6

Conspiracy

ﺍﻟﻤﺆﺍﻣﺮﺓ

3

Terrorism

ﺍﻻﺭﻫﺎﺏ

4

/ ﺍﻟﺘﻀﺤﻴﺔ
ﺍﻻﺳﺘﺸﻬﺎﺩ

8

Violation

Sacrifice
(Martyrdom)

ﺍﻟﻤﻘﺎﻭﻣﺔ

also
referred to
as war of
existential
defense
( ﺣﺮﺏ ﺍﻟﺪﻓﺎﻉ
20 )ﻋﻦ ﺍﻟﻮﺟﻮﺩ

Ottoman
Occupation

ﺍﻻﺣﺘﻼﻝ
ﺍﻟﻌﺜﻤﺎﻧﻲ

related to
failed and
decaying
state norms
and
11 institutions

Nationalist Christian
Notion
Community

ﺍﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ
ﺍﻟﻤﺴﻴﺤﻲ

associated
with the
21 nation

ﺍﻟﻤﺎﺭﻭﻧﻲ

Associated
with
Christian
4 villages

Resistance

Maronite
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, ﺯﺣﻠﺔ:
 ﻋﻴﻦ, ﺍﻻﺷﺮﻓﻴﺔ
ﺍﻟﺮﻣﺎﻧﻴﺔ
Nation/Land
Crucified

/ ﺍﻟﻮﻁﻦ
ﺍﻷﺭﺽ

8

ﻣﻌﻠﻘﻴﻦ ﻋﻠﻰ
ﺍﻟﺼﻠﻴﺐ

11

Victimizatio
n of Lebanon
Violated

3
ﻣﻐﺘﺼﺐ

3
10

10452 Km
Civilization

ﺍﻟﺤﻀﺎﺭﺓ

15

6000 years
(Phoenician
reference)

ﺳﺘﺔ ﺍﻻﻑ
ﺳﻨﺔ

10

Cooperation
and Unity

8

Against
Federation
Concept

5

Reinstating
Sectarianism

Sectarianis
m within
context of
peaceful
2 cooperation

Lebanon the
Farm/
Lebanon of
the Brokers

ﻟﺒﻨﺎﻥ
ﺍﻟﻤﺰﺭﻋﺔ ﻭ
ﺍﻟﺴﻤﺎﺳﺮﺓ

5
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Table 2: Analysis of Bashir Gemayel’s Speech
made in Ein El Rummaneh for the 7th anniversary
of the beginning of the war (13/4/1982)
Category

Key Words Arabic

Tally

The Other The Syrian

ﺍﻟﺳﻭﺭﻱ

4

The
Palestinian

ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺳﻁﻳﻧﻲ

5

ﺍﻟﻠﺑﻧﺎﻧﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﻠﻡ

3

Israel

ﺍﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻝ

0

Foreigner

ﺍﻟﻐﺭﻳﺏ

11

ﺍﻟﻌﺩﻭ

1

Occupation/
Nightmare

ﺍﻟﻛﺎﺑﻭﺱ/ ﺍﻻﺣﺗﻼﻝ

4

(Palestinian)
Settlement

(ﺍﻟﺗﻭﻁﻳﻥ )ﺍﻟﻠﺑﻧﺎﻧﻲ

6

Conspiracy

ﺍﻟﻣﺅﺍﻣﺭﺓ

3

Terrorism

ﺍﻻﺭﻫﺎﺏ

4

ﺍﻟﻣﺟﺗﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﻳﺣﻲ

2

Collusion

ﺍﻟﺗﻭﺍﻁﺅ

2

Treachery

ﻏﺩﺭ

2

The
Lebanese
Muslim

Conflict

enemy

Nationalist Christian
Notion
Community
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Liberation

ﺗﺣﺭﻳﺭ

4

Resistance

ﺍﻟﻣﻘﺎﻭﻣﺔ ﻭ ﺍﻟﺻﻣﻭﺩ

16

ﺍﻟﺗﺿﺣﻳﺔ

2

Sacrifice
10452 Km
Civilization

1

ﺍﻟﺣﺿﺎﺭﺓ

1

Conclusion
The identity construction of the Phalange was a
complex process that, being based on Maronite
nationalist ideology, is strongly conscious of the
Other. By examining the ways the Phalange
identifies itself and its role, and the extent to
which it complies with true fascist ideologies,
one can understand the ways by which they
identify the Other and the extent to which they
will go in their daily interaction. The Other is,
however, not a static one, nor formulated through
religious differences, but entails a more diverse
combination of factors. One of the important
ones are the economic consideration that the
Phalange must bear as a consequence of its
unusual role as a Zaim representing the elite of
Finance and Commerce as well as the Maronite
community as a whole. Indeed the "family" is
referred to as one of the three basic tenets to the
Phalange's belief system in its anthem, strongly
48
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indicating an association with and preservation of
this traditional role, albeit in a modern guise.
Similarly, the myth of a favoured and friendly
Israeli Other, who is closer to the Phalange self is
just that, a myth.
The primary sources analysed are ideological
writing by Pierre Gemayel and speeches by his
son Bashir. I chose this succession of primary
sources across a few decades so that the
similarities and differences may highlight
particularly important points pertaining to the
question of the Other. The similarities between
the writing reflect the great place the Other takes
in Phalange ideology and action, in addition to
showing how pure and predominantly fascist and
reductionist perceptions of the Other are
circumscribed and held in check in by the
Phalange’s need to provide for its political and
economic interests and those of the community
and elites it represents. The differences on the
other hand, highlight the intensification and
radicalisation of their perception as threats seem
more eminent, the Other more terrorising,
proximal and thus a scale of Others is created
where the less threatening Other is temporarily
sought for help. According to AlAmal in October
1980 "said the partition of the country had taken
place in west Beirut which has fallen under the
control of Syrian Baathists, Palestinians,
communists and Arab nationalists invasion that
sought to change Lebanon’s identity in order to
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Arabise and Islamise the country. "real Lebanon"
has been reduced to what is pejoratively is known
as the Christian ghetto" (Traboulsi 211). That, in
essence, sums up Phalange's perception of itself,
identifies the various Others, the difference
between them being mainly the different ways
with which they identified the Lebanese state.
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Appendix 1 – List of Anthems
ﻫﻴﺎ ﻓﺘﻰ ﺍﻟﻜﺘﺎﺋﺐ

•

ﺍﻟﻨﺸﻴﺪ ﺍﻟﻮﻁﻨﻲ ﺍﻟﻠﺒﻨﺎﻧﻲ

•

ﺍﻟﺸﻴﺦ ﺑﻴﺎﺭ ﺑﺘﺒﻘﻰ ﻣﻌﻦ

•

ﺍﺷﺮﻓﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺒﺪﺍﻳﺔ

•

ﺣﺰﺏ ﺍﻟﻜﺘﺎﺋﺐ ﻋﺎﻟﺮﺍﺱ

•

ﺫﻛﺮﻯ ﺍﻟـ70

•

ﻋﺎﻟﺼﺨﺮ ﻣﻨﺤﻔﺮ ﻛﺘﺎﺋﺐ

•

ﻋﺮﻳﺲ ﺍﻟﺤﻠﻢ ﺍﻻﺧﻀﺮ

•

ﻋﺴﻜﺮ ﻧﺤﻨﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻣﻨﻨﻬﺎﺏ

•

ﻛﺘﺎﺋﺐ ﺍﻡ ﺍﻟﻘﻀﻴﺔ ﻛﻠﻬﺎ

•

ﻟﺒﻴﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﺘﺤﻴﺔ

•

ﻣﺜﻞ ﺍﻟﺸﻤﺲ

•

ﻣﻦ ﺯﻣﺎﻥ

•

ﻣﻦ ﻫﺎﻙ ﺍﻟﻤﻠﻌﺐ

•

ﻣﻨﻬﺘﻮﻑ ﻛﺘﺎﺋﺐ

•

ﻧﺎﺩﺗﻠﻲ ﺍﻟﻴﻤﺎﻣﺔ

•

ﻧﻘﻮﻝ ﻻ

•

ﻭﻳﻨﻚ ﻳﺎ ﻫﻞ ﻭﺍﻗﻒ

•
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•

ﻫ ّﺰﺕ ﻣﻨﺎﺯﻟﻨﺎ

•

ﻳﺎ ﺭﻳّﺴﻨﺎ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﺋﺪ

•

ﻳﺎ ﻟﻴﻠﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﻴﺎﻟﻲ

•

ﻳﺎ ﻣﻮﺳﻊ ﺍﻟﺴﺎﺣﺎﺕ
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